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Politics
By Aristotle
Written 350 B.C.E
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
Part I
Every tate is a community of some kind, and every community
is established with a view to some good; for mankind always
act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if
all communities aim at some good, the state or political community,
which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest,
aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the
highest good.
Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman,
king, householder, and master are the same, and that they
differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects.
For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over
more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number,
a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between
a great household and a small state. The distinction which
is made between the king and the statesman is as follows:
When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when,
according to the rules of the political science, the citizens
rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.
But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind,
as will be evident to any one who considers the matter according
to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments
of science, so in politics, the compound should always be
resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole.
We must therefore look at the elements of which the state
is composed, in order that we may see in what the different
kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether any scientific
result can be attained about each one of them.
Part II
He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin,
whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest
view of them. In the first place there must be a union of
those who cannot exist without each other; namely, of male
and female, that the race may continue (and this is a union
which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in
common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a
natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves),
and of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved.
For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature
intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its
body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature
a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Now
nature has distinguished between the female and the slave.
For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the
Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single
use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one
and not for many uses. But among barbarians no distinction
is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural
ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and
female. Wherefore the poets say, "It is meet that Hellenes
should rule over barbarians; "as if they thought that
the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.
Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master
and slave, the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod
is right when he says, "First house and wife and an ox
for the plough, " for the ox is the poor man's slave.
The family is the association established by nature for the
supply of men's everyday wants, and the members of it are
called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard,' and by Epimenides
the Cretan, 'companions of the manger.' But when several families
are united, and the association aims at something more than
the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed
is the village. And the most natural form of the village appears
to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children
and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same
milk.' And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally
governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule
before they came together, as the barbarians still are. Every
family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies
of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because
they were of the same blood. As Homer says: "Each one
gives law to his children and to his wives. "
For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times.
Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, because they
themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule
of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods,
but their ways of life to be like their own.
When several villages are united in a single complete community,
large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state
comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life,
and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And
therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so
is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of
a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed,
we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse,
or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is
the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.
Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature,
and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by
nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either
a bad man or above humanity; he is like the "Tribeless,
lawless, hearthless one, "whom Homer denounces- the natural
outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to
an isolated piece at draughts.
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any
other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say,
makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she
has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice
is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore
found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception
of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another,
and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth
the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the
just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that
he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust,
and the like, and the association of living beings who have
this sense makes a family and a state.
Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family
and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior
to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed,
there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense,
as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the
hand will be no better than that. But things are defined by
their working and power; and we ought not to say that they
are the same when they no longer have their proper quality,
but only that they have the same name. The proof that the
state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual
is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing;
and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole.
But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need
because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast
or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted
in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state
was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected,
is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice,
he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more
dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to
be used by intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the
worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most
unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of
lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states,
for the administration of justice, which is the determination
of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.
Part III
Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before
speaking of the state we must speak of the management of the
household. The parts of household management correspond to
the persons who compose the household, and a complete household
consists of slaves and freemen. Now we should begin by examining
everything in its fewest possible elements; and the first
and fewest possible parts of a family are master and slave,
husband and wife, father and children. We have therefore to
consider what each of these three relations is and ought to
be: I mean the relation of master and servant, the marriage
relation (the conjunction of man and wife has no name of its
own), and thirdly, the procreative relation (this also has
no proper name). And there is another element of a household,
the so-called art of getting wealth, which, according to some,
is identical with household management, according to others,
a principal part of it; the nature of this art will also have
to be considered by us.
Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs
of practical life and also seeking to attain some better theory
of their relation than exists at present. For some are of
opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the
management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and
the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the outset,
are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master
over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction
between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature;
and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust.
Part IV
Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring
property is a part of the art of managing the household; for
no man can live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be
provided with necessaries. And as in the arts which have a
definite sphere the workers must have their own proper instruments
for the accomplishment of their work, so it is in the management
of a household. Now instruments are of various sorts; some
are living, others lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a
ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, a living instrument;
for in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument. Thus,
too, a possession is an instrument for maintaining life. And
so, in the arrangement of the family, a slave is a living
possession, and property a number of such instruments; and
the servant is himself an instrument which takes precedence
of all other instruments. For if every instrument could accomplish
its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others,
like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus,
which, says the poet, "of their own accord entered the
assembly of the Gods; " if, in like manner, the shuttle
would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand
to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor
masters slaves. Here, however, another distinction must be
drawn; the instruments commonly so called are instruments
of production, whilst a possession is an instrument of action.
The shuttle, for example, is not only of use; but something
else is made by it, whereas of a garment or of a bed there
is only the use. Further, as production and action are different
in kind, and both require instruments, the instruments which
they employ must likewise differ in kind. But life is action
and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister
of action. Again, a possession is spoken of as a part is spoken
of; for the part is not only a part of something else, but
wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a possession.
The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong
to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master,
but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature
and office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but
another's man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to
be another's man who, being a human being, is also a possession.
And a possession may be defined as an instrument of action,
separable from the possessor.
Part V
But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave,
and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather
is not all slavery a violation of nature?
There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds
both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and
others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient;
from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection,
others for rule.
And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and
that rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects-
for example, to rule over men is better than to rule over
wild beasts; for the work is better which is executed by better
workmen, and where one man rules and another is ruled, they
may be said to have a work); for in all things which form
a composite whole and which are made up of parts, whether
continuous or discrete, a distinction between the ruling and
the subject element comes to fight. Such a duality exists
in living creatures, but not in them only; it originates in
the constitution of the universe; even in things which have
no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical mode.
But we are wandering from the subject. We will therefore restrict
ourselves to the living creature, which, in the first place,
consists of soul and body: and of these two, the one is by
nature the ruler, and the other the subject. But then we must
look for the intentions of nature in things which retain their
nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore
we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both
of body and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation
of the two; although in bad or corrupted natures the body
will often appear to rule over the soul, because they are
in an evil and unnatural condition. At all events we may firstly
observe in living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional
rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule,
whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional
and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul
over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over
the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality
of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful.
The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame
animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals
are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are
preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the
female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled;
this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.
Where then there is such a difference as that between soul
and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those
whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing
better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better
for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the
rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is, another's
and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend,
but not to have, such a principle, is a slave by nature. Whereas
the lower animals cannot even apprehend a principle; they
obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and
of tame animals is not very different; for both with their
bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to
distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making
the one strong for servile labor, the other upright, and although
useless for such services, useful for political life in the
arts both of war and peace. But the opposite often happens-
that some have the souls and others have the bodies of freemen.
And doubtless if men differed from one another in the mere
forms of their bodies as much as the statues of the Gods do
from men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class should
be slaves of the superior. And if this is true of the body,
how much more just that a similar distinction should exist
in the soul? but the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the
beauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear, then, that some
men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these
latter slavery is both expedient and right.
Part VI
But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain
way right on their side, may be easily seen. For the words
slavery and slave are used in two senses. There is a slave
or slavery by law as well as by nature. The law of which I
speak is a sort of convention- the law by which whatever is
taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But this
right many jurists impeach, as they would an orator who brought
forward an unconstitutional measure: they detest the notion
that, because one man has the power of doing violence and
is superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave
and subject. Even among philosophers there is a difference
of opinion. The origin of the dispute, and what makes the
views invade each other's territory, is as follows: in some
sense virtue, when furnished with means, has actually the
greatest power of exercising force; and as superior power
is only found where there is superior excellence of some kind,
power seems to imply virtue, and the dispute to be simply
one about justice (for it is due to one party identifying
justice with goodwill while the other identifies it with the
mere rule of the stronger). If these views are thus set out
separately, the other views have no force or plausibility
against the view that the superior in virtue ought to rule,
or be master. Others, clinging, as they think, simply to a
principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice),
assume that slavery in accordance with the custom of war is
justified by law, but at the same moment they deny this. For
what if the cause of the war be unjust? And again, no one
would ever say he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave.
Were this the case, men of the highest rank would be slaves
and the children of slaves if they or their parents chance
to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do
not like to call Hellenes slaves, but confine the term to
barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they really mean
the natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it must be
admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere.
The same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard themselves
as noble everywhere, and not only in their own country, but
they deem the barbarians noble only when at home, thereby
implying that there are two sorts of nobility and freedom,
the one absolute, the other relative. The Helen of Theodectes
says: "Who would presume to call me servant who am on
both sides sprung from the stem of the Gods? " What does
this mean but that they distinguish freedom and slavery, noble
and humble birth, by the two principles of good and evil?
They think that as men and animals beget men and animals,
so from good men a good man springs. But this is what nature,
though she may intend it, cannot always accomplish.
We see then that there is some foundation for this difference
of opinion, and that all are not either slaves by nature or
freemen by nature, and also that there is in some cases a
marked distinction between the two classes, rendering it expedient
and right for the one to be slaves and the others to be masters:
the one practicing obedience, the others exercising the authority
and lordship which nature intended them to have. The abuse
of this authority is injurious to both; for the interests
of part and whole, of body and soul, are the same, and the
slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part
of his bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of master and
slave between them is natural they are friends and have a
common interest, but where it rests merely on law and force
the reverse is true.
Part VII
The previous remarks are quite enough to show that the rule
of a master is not a constitutional rule, and that all the
different kinds of rule are not, as some affirm, the same
with each other. For there is one rule exercised over subjects
who are by nature free, another over subjects who are by nature
slaves. The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house
is under one head: whereas constitutional rule is a government
of freemen and equals. The master is not called a master because
he has science, but because he is of a certain character,
and the same remark applies to the slave and the freeman.
Still there may be a science for the master and science for
the slave. The science of the slave would be such as the man
of Syracuse taught, who made money by instructing slaves in
their ordinary duties. And such a knowledge may be carried
further, so as to include cookery and similar menial arts.
For some duties are of the more necessary, others of the more
honorable sort; as the proverb says, 'slave before slave,
master before master.' But all such branches of knowledge
are servile. There is likewise a science of the master, which
teaches the use of slaves; for the master as such is concerned,
not with the acquisition, but with the use of them. Yet this
so-called science is not anything great or wonderful; for
the master need only know how to order that which the slave
must know how to execute. Hence those who are in a position
which places them above toil have stewards who attend to their
households while they occupy themselves with philosophy or
with politics. But the art of acquiring slaves, I mean of
justly acquiring them, differs both from the art of the master
and the art of the slave, being a species of hunting or war.
Enough of the distinction between master and slave.
Part VIII
Let us now inquire into property generally, and into the art
of getting wealth, in accordance with our usual method, for
a slave has been shown to be a part of property. The first
question is whether the art of getting wealth is the same
with the art of managing a household or a part of it, or instrumental
to it; and if the last, whether in the way that the art of
making shuttles is instrumental to the art of weaving, or
in the way that the casting of bronze is instrumental to the
art of the statuary, for they are not instrumental in the
same way, but the one provides tools and the other material;
and by material I mean the substratum out of which any work
is made; thus wool is the material of the weaver, bronze of
the statuary. Now it is easy to see that the art of household
management is not identical with the art of getting wealth,
for the one uses the material which the other provides. For
the art which uses household stores can be no other than the
art of household management. There is, however, a doubt whether
the art of getting wealth is a part of household management
or a distinct art. If the getter of wealth has to consider
whence wealth and property can be procured, but there are
many sorts of property and riches, then are husbandry, and
the care and provision of food in general, parts of the wealth-getting
art or distinct arts? Again, there are many sorts of food,
and therefore there are many kinds of lives both of animals
and men; they must all have food, and the differences in their
food have made differences in their ways of life. For of beasts,
some are gregarious, others are solitary; they live in the
way which is best adapted to sustain them, accordingly as
they are carnivorous or herbivorous or omnivorous: and their
habits are determined for them by nature in such a manner
that they may obtain with greater facility the food of their
choice. But, as different species have different tastes, the
same things are not naturally pleasant to all of them; and
therefore the lives of carnivorous or herbivorous animals
further differ among themselves. In the lives of men too there
is a great difference. The laziest are shepherds, who lead
an idle life, and get their subsistence without trouble from
tame animals; their flocks having to wander from place to
place in search of pasture, they are compelled to follow them,
cultivating a sort of living farm. Others support themselves
by hunting, which is of different kinds. Some, for example,
are brigands, others, who dwell near lakes or marshes or rivers
or a sea in which there are fish, are fishermen, and others
live by the pursuit of birds or wild beasts. The greater number
obtain a living from the cultivated fruits of the soil. Such
are the modes of subsistence which prevail among those whose
industry springs up of itself, and whose food is not acquired
by exchange and retail trade- there is the shepherd, the husbandman,
the brigand, the fisherman, the hunter. Some gain a comfortable
maintenance out of two employments, eking out the deficiencies
of one of them by another: thus the life of a shepherd may
be combined with that of a brigand, the life of a farmer with
that of a hunter. Other modes of life are similarly combined
in any way which the needs of men may require. Property, in
the sense of a bare livelihood, seems to be given by nature
herself to all, both when they are first born, and when they
are grown up. For some animals bring forth, together with
their offspring, so much food as will last until they are
able to supply themselves; of this the vermiparous or oviparous
animals are an instance; and the viviparous animals have up
to a certain time a supply of food for their young in themselves,
which is called milk. In like manner we may infer that, after
the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, and that
the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for
use and food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part
of them, for food, and for the provision of clothing and various
instruments. Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing
in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals
for the sake of man. And so, in one point of view, the art
of war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition
includes hunting, an art which we ought to practice against
wild beasts, and against men who, though intended by nature
to be governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind is
naturally just.
Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind which by
nature is a part of the management of a household, in so far
as the art of household management must either find ready
to hand, or itself provide, such things necessary to life,
and useful for the community of the family or state, as can
be stored. They are the elements of true riches; for the amount
of property which is needed for a good life is not unlimited,
although Solon in one of his poems says that
"No bound to riches has been fixed for man. "
But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other
arts; for the instruments of any art are never unlimited,
either in number or size, and riches may be defined as a number
of instruments to be used in a household or in a state. And
so we see that there is a natural art of acquisition which
is practiced by managers of households and by statesmen, and
what is the reason of this.
Part IX
There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is
commonly and rightly called an art of wealth-getting, and
has in fact suggested the notion that riches and property
have no limit. Being nearly connected with the preceding,
it is often identified with it. But though they are not very
different, neither are they the same. The kind already described
is given by nature, the other is gained by experience and
art.
Let us begin our discussion of the question with the following
considerations:
Of everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong
to the thing as such, but not in the same manner, for one
is the proper, and the other the improper or secondary use
of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for
exchange; both are uses of the shoe. He who gives a shoe in
exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed
use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary
purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter.
The same may be said of all possessions, for the art of exchange
extends to all of them, and it arises at first from what is
natural, from the circumstance that some have too little,
others too much. Hence we may infer that retail trade is not
a natural part of the art of getting wealth; had it been so,
men would have ceased to exchange when they had enough. In
the first community, indeed, which is the family, this art
is obviously of no use, but it begins to be useful when the
society increases. For the members of the family originally
had all things in common; later, when the family divided into
parts, the parts shared in many things, and different parts
in different things, which they had to give in exchange for
what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still practiced
among barbarous nations who exchange with one another the
necessaries of life and nothing more; giving and receiving
wine, for example, in exchange for coin, and the like. This
sort of barter is not part of the wealth-getting art and is
not contrary to nature, but is needed for the satisfaction
of men's natural wants. The other or more complex form of
exchange grew, as might have been inferred, out of the simpler.
When the inhabitants of one country became more dependent
on those of another, and they imported what they needed, and
exported what they had too much of, money necessarily came
into use. For the various necessaries of life are not easily
carried about, and hence men agreed to employ in their dealings
with each other something which was intrinsically useful and
easily applicable to the purposes of life, for example, iron,
silver, and the like. Of this the value was at first measured
simply by size and weight, but in process of time they put
a stamp upon it, to save the trouble of weighing and to mark
the value.
When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the
barter of necessary articles arose the other art of wealth
getting, namely, retail trade; which was at first probably
a simple matter, but became more complicated as soon as men
learned by experience whence and by what exchanges the greatest
profit might be made. Originating in the use of coin, the
art of getting wealth is generally thought to be chiefly concerned
with it, and to be the art which produces riches and wealth;
having to consider how they may be accumulated. Indeed, riches
is assumed by many to be only a quantity of coin, because
the arts of getting wealth and retail trade are concerned
with coin. Others maintain that coined money is a mere sham,
a thing not natural, but conventional only, because, if the
users substitute another commodity for it, it is worthless,
and because it is not useful as a means to any of the necessities
of life, and, indeed, he who is rich in coin may often be
in want of necessary food. But how can that be wealth of which
a man may have a great abundance and yet perish with hunger,
like Midas in the fable, whose insatiable prayer turned everything
that was set before him into gold?
Hence men seek after a better notion of riches and of the
art of getting wealth than the mere acquisition of coin, and
they are right. For natural riches and the natural art of
wealth-getting are a different thing; in their true form they
are part of the management of a household; whereas retail
trade is the art of producing wealth, not in every way, but
by exchange. And it is thought to be concerned with coin;
for coin is the unit of exchange and the measure or limit
of it. And there is no bound to the riches which spring from
this art of wealth getting. As in the art of medicine there
is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other
arts there is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends,
for they aim at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost
(but of the means there is a limit, for the end is always
the limit), so, too, in this art of wealth-getting there is
no limit of the end, which is riches of the spurious kind,
and the acquisition of wealth. But the art of wealth-getting
which consists in household management, on the other hand,
has a limit; the unlimited acquisition of wealth is not its
business. And, therefore, in one point of view, all riches
must have a limit; nevertheless, as a matter of fact, we find
the opposite to be the case; for all getters of wealth increase
their hoard of coin without limit. The source of the confusion
is the near connection between the two kinds of wealth-getting;
in either, the instrument is the same, although the use is
different, and so they pass into one another; for each is
a use of the same property, but with a difference: accumulation
is the end in the one case, but there is a further end in
the other. Hence some persons are led to believe that getting
wealth is the object of household management, and the whole
idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase
their money without limit, or at any rate not to lose it.
The origin of this disposition in men is that they are intent
upon living only, and not upon living well; and, as their
desires are unlimited they also desire that the means of gratifying
them should be without limit. Those who do aim at a good life
seek the means of obtaining bodily pleasures; and, since the
enjoyment of these appears to depend on property, they are
absorbed in getting wealth: and so there arises the second
species of wealth-getting. For, as their enjoyment is in excess,
they seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment; and,
if they are not able to supply their pleasures by the art
of getting wealth, they try other arts, using in turn every
faculty in a manner contrary to nature. The quality of courage,
for example, is not intended to make wealth, but to inspire
confidence; neither is this the aim of the general's or of
the physician's art; but the one aims at victory and the other
at health. Nevertheless, some men turn every quality or art
into a means of getting wealth; this they conceive to be the
end, and to the promotion of the end they think all things
must contribute.
Thus, then, we have considered the art of wealth-getting which
is unnecessary, and why men want it; and also the necessary
art of wealth-getting, which we have seen to be different
from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing
a household, concerned with the provision of food, not, however,
like the former kind, unlimited, but having a limit.
Part X
And we have found the answer to our original question, Whether
the art of getting wealth is the business of the manager of
a household and of the statesman or not their business? viz.,
that wealth is presupposed by them. For as political science
does not make men, but takes them from nature and uses them,
so too nature provides them with earth or sea or the like
as a source of food. At this stage begins the duty of the
manager of a household, who has to order the things which
nature supplies; he may be compared to the weaver who has
not to make but to use wool, and to know, too, what sort of
wool is good and serviceable or bad and unserviceable. Were
this otherwise, it would be difficult to see why the art of
getting wealth is a part of the management of a household
and the art of medicine not; for surely the members of a household
must have health just as they must have life or any other
necessary. The answer is that as from one point of view the
master of the house and the ruler of the state have to consider
about health, from another point of view not they but the
physician; so in one way the art of household management,
in another way the subordinate art, has to consider about
wealth. But, strictly speaking, as I have already said, the
means of life must be provided beforehand by nature; for the
business of nature is to furnish food to that which is born,
and the food of the offspring is always what remains over
of that from which it is produced. Wherefore the art of getting
wealth out of fruits and animals is always natural.
There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one
is a part of household management, the other is retail trade:
the former necessary and honorable, while that which consists
in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a
mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort,
and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain
out of money itself, and not from the natural object of it.
For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to
increase at interest. And this term interest, which means
the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding
of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore
of an modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural.
Part XI
Enough has been said about the theory of wealth-getting; we
will now proceed to the practical part. The discussion of
such matters is not unworthy of philosophy, but to be engaged
in them practically is illiberal and irksome. The useful parts
of wealth-getting are, first, the knowledge of livestock-
which are most profitable, and where, and how- as, for example,
what sort of horses or sheep or oxen or any other animals
are most likely to give a return. A man ought to know which
of these pay better than others, and which pay best in particular
places, for some do better in one place and some in another.
Secondly, husbandry, which may be either tillage or planting,
and the keeping of bees and of fish, or fowl, or of any animals
which may be useful to man. These are the divisions of the
true or proper art of wealth-getting and come first. Of the
other, which consists in exchange, the first and most important
division is commerce (of which there are three kinds- the
provision of a ship, the conveyance of goods, exposure for
sale- these again differing as they are safer or more profitable),
the second is usury, the third, service for hire- of this,
one kind is employed in the mechanical arts, the other in
unskilled and bodily labor. There is still a third sort of
wealth getting intermediate between this and the first or
natural mode which is partly natural, but is also concerned
with exchange, viz., the industries that make their profit
from the earth, and from things growing from the earth which,
although they bear no fruit, are nevertheless profitable;
for example, the cutting of timber and all mining. The art
of mining, by which minerals are obtained, itself has many
branches, for there are various kinds of things dug out of
the earth. Of the several divisions of wealth-getting I now
speak generally; a minute consideration of them might be useful
in practice, but it would be tiresome to dwell upon them at
greater length now.
Those occupations are most truly arts in which there is the
least element of chance; they are the meanest in which the
body is most deteriorated, the most servile in which there
is the greatest use of the body, and the most illiberal in
which there is the least need of excellence.
Works have been written upon these subjects by various persons;
for example, by Chares the Parian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian,
who have treated of Tillage and Planting, while others have
treated of other branches; any one who cares for such matters
may refer to their writings. It would be well also to collect
the scattered stories of the ways in which individuals have
succeeded in amassing a fortune; for all this is useful to
persons who value the art of getting wealth. There is the
anecdote of Thales the Milesian and his financial device,
which involves a principle of universal application, but is
attributed to him on account of his reputation for wisdom.
He was reproached for his poverty, which was supposed to show
that philosophy was of no use. According to the story, he
knew by his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that
there would be a great harvest of olives in the coming year;
so, having a little money, he gave deposits for the use of
all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which he hired
at a low price because no one bid against him. When the harvest-time
came, and many were wanted all at once and of a sudden, he
let them out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity
of money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers can easily
be rich if they like, but that their ambition is of another
sort. He is supposed to have given a striking proof of his
wisdom, but, as I was saying, his device for getting wealth
is of universal application, and is nothing but the creation
of a monopoly. It is an art often practiced by cities when
they are want of money; they make a monopoly of provisions.
There was a man of Sicily, who, having money deposited with
him, bought up an the iron from the iron mines; afterwards,
when the merchants from their various markets came to buy,
he was the only seller, and without much increasing the price
he gained 200 per cent. Which when Dionysius heard, he told
him that he might take away his money, but that he must not
remain at Syracuse, for he thought that the man had discovered
a way of making money which was injurious to his own interests.
He made the same discovery as Thales; they both contrived
to create a monopoly for themselves. And statesmen as well
ought to know these things; for a state is often as much in
want of money and of such devices for obtaining it as a household,
or even more so; hence some public men devote themselves entirely
to finance.
Part XII
Of household management we have seen that there are three
parts- one is the rule of a master over slaves, which has
been discussed already, another of a father, and the third
of a husband. A husband and father, we saw, rules over wife
and children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule over
his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional
rule. For although there may be exceptions to the order of
nature, the male is by nature fitter for command than the
female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the
younger and more immature. But in most constitutional states
the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of
a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens
are equal, and do not differ at all. Nevertheless, when one
rules and the other is ruled we endeavor to create a difference
of outward forms and names and titles of respect, which may
be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan.
The relation of the male to the female is of this kind, but
there the inequality is permanent. The rule of a father over
his children is royal, for he rules by virtue both of love
and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal
power. And therefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus 'father
of Gods and men,' because he is the king of them all. For
a king is the natural superior of his subjects, but he should
be of the same kin or kind with them, and such is the relation
of elder and younger, of father and son.
Part XIII
Thus it is clear that household management attends more to
men than to the acquisition of inanimate things, and to human
excellence more than to the excellence of property which we
call wealth, and to the virtue of freemen more than to the
virtue of slaves. A question may indeed be raised, whether
there is any excellence at all in a slave beyond and higher
than merely instrumental and ministerial qualities- whether
he can have the virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and
the like; or whether slaves possess only bodily and ministerial
qualities. And, whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty
arises; for, if they have virtue, in what will they differ
from freemen? On the other hand, since they are men and share
in rational principle, it seems absurd to say that they have
no virtue. A similar question may be raised about women and
children, whether they too have virtues: ought a woman to
be temperate and brave and just, and is a child to be called
temperate, and intemperate, or note So in general we may ask
about the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether
they have the same or different virtues. For if a noble nature
is equally required in both, why should one of them always
rule, and the other always be ruled? Nor can we say that this
is a question of degree, for the difference between ruler
and subject is a difference of kind, which the difference
of more and less never is. Yet how strange is the supposition
that the one ought, and that the other ought not, to have
virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can
he rule well? If the subject, how can he obey well? If he
be licentious and cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty.
It is evident, therefore, that both of them must have a share
of virtue, but varying as natural subjects also vary among
themselves. Here the very constitution of the soul has shown
us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and the other
is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we in maintain to
be different from that of the subject; the one being the virtue
of the rational, and the other of the irrational part. Now,
it is obvious that the same principle applies generally, and
therefore almost all things rule and are ruled according to
nature. But the kind of rule differs; the freeman rules over
the slave after another manner from that in which the male
rules over the female, or the man over the child; although
the parts of the soul are present in an of them, they are
present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative
faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority,
and the child has, but it is immature. So it must necessarily
be supposed to be with the moral virtues also; all should
partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is
required by each for the fulfillment of his duty. Hence the
ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for his function,
taken absolutely, demands a master artificer, and rational
principle is such an artificer; the subjects, oil the other
hand, require only that measure of virtue which is proper
to each of them. Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all
of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the
courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates
maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding,
of a woman in obeying. And this holds of all other virtues,
as will be more clearly seen if we look at them in detail,
for those who say generally that virtue consists in a good
disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like,
only deceive themselves. Far better than such definitions
is their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, enumerate the
virtues. All classes must be deemed to have their special
attributes; as the poet says of women, "Silence is a
woman's glory, "but this is not equally the glory of
man. The child is imperfect, and therefore obviously his virtue
is not relative to himself alone, but to the perfect man and
to his teacher, and in like manner the virtue of the slave
is relative to a master. Now we determined that a slave is
useful for the wants of life, and therefore he will obviously
require only so much virtue as will prevent him from failing
in his duty through cowardice or lack of self-control. Some
one will ask whether, if what we are saying is true, virtue
will not be required also in the artisans, for they often
fail in their work through the lack of self control? But is
there not a great difference in the two cases? For the slave
shares in his master's life; the artisan is less closely connected
with him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he
becomes a slave. The meaner sort of mechanic has a special
and separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature,
not so the shoemaker or other artisan. It is manifest, then,
that the master ought to be the source of such excellence
in the slave, and not a mere possessor of the art of mastership
which trains the slave in his duties. Wherefore they are mistaken
who forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we should
employ command only, for slaves stand even more in need of
admonition than children.
So much for this subject; the relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, their several virtues, what in their intercourse
with one another is good, and what is evil, and how we may
pursue the good and good and escape the evil, will have to
be discussed when we speak of the different forms of government.
For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these
relationships are the parts of a family, and the virtue of
the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole, women
and children must be trained by education with an eye to the
constitution, if the virtues of either of them are supposed
to make any difference in the virtues of the state. And they
must make a difference: for the children grow up to be citizens,
and half the free persons in a state are women.
Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let
us speak at another time. Regarding, then, our present inquiry
as complete, we will make a new beginning. And, first, let
us examine the various theories of a perfect state.
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